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ARGUMENT
I.

A SPOUSE'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IS NOT ONLY
SEPARATE, UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE STIPULATED FACTS OF
THIS CASE SEPARATE PER PERSON POLICY LIMITS ARE REQUIRED.
At the hearing below, the trial court stated: "the law ought to be as [the Vierras'

counsel] tells me it should be, because indeed the injury of the spouse is that spouse's injury,
and it seems to me that it ought to be separately subject to compensation." (R. at 254, p. 5.)
It is no surprise, therefore, that on appeal, the first point of Farmers' argument concedes that
a spouse's claim for loss of consortium is separate from the other spouse's bodily injury
claim. (Brief of Appellee ("Farmers' Brief), p. 3.) See also Hackford v. Utah Power &
Light Co.. 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting).
Thus, this case is no longer bogged down with any misconception that Mr. Vierra's
loss of consortium claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11 for separate and distinct
individual damages should be treated as if it were the same as Mrs. Vierra's claim for bodily
injury damages. The issue is whether Farmers must allow its insured, Don Versaw, a
separate policy limit for the separate injury to Mr. Vierra's marital interest.1 As explained
in this Reply Brief, under Utah law and the stipulated facts of this case, Farmers must
provide two separate per person policy limits.
1

Married persons have recognized interests in each other's company, society,
cooperation, and affection. Boucher v. Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah
1992). Injury to this type of marital interest is evident when there is a "significant
permanent injury to a [spouse] that substantially changes that [spouse's] life style". Utah
Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a). Where, as here, a tortfeasor injures the marital relationship so
severely that it renders a spouse incapable of "performing the types of jobs [he or she]
performed before the injury", one of the three explicit bases for bringing a claim under the
loss of consortium statute is satisfied. Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii).
-1-

Farmers concedes that the "policy of automobile liability insurance issued to Mr.
Versaw must insure him against loss from liability imposed by law, including liability
pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium statute." (Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) "Regarding this
question of loss of consortium as a separate claim," Farmers also admits that its "policy does
say that if Utah treats loss of consortium as a separate claim, it'll bump up this
minimum coverage to comply with Utah law . .." (R. at 245, p. 24) (emphasis added.)
Indeed, this concession is mandated by the two inconsistent loss of consortium paragraphs
in Farmers' policy, which state:
The bodily injury liability limit for "each person" is the maximum for bodily
injury sustained by one person in any occurrence. Any claim for loss of
consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury will be
included in this limit.
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss
of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will be
furnished.2
(See R. 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (bold italics added).
Therefore, under the policy language itself, if loss of consortium claims are treated
as separate claims in Utah, a separate per person policy limit must be provided. Based on
applicable Utah law and the facts Farmers stipulated to for purposes of this Declaratory
Action, Farmers' interpretation of its policy wrongly denies Mr. Versaw the coverage
required in this situation because here there are two separate per person policy limit claims,
one for bodily injury and one for loss of consortium.

2

As discussed below, this policy language is inherently ambiguous. The second
paragraph of Farmers' policy essentially renders the first paragraph meaningless.
-2-

Farmers attempts to side step the fact that there are two distinct policy limit claims
which require separate coverage under the loss of consortium statute, Utah Code Ann. §302-11, and the Married Woman's Act, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4, by arguing that neither Mr.
Vierra nor Mrs. Vierra is limited in their ability to pursue excess policy judgments.
(Farmers' Brief, p. 8.) Thus, Farmers simply ignores the impact of its per person coverage
position by asserting that "regardless of her marital status, Mrs. Vierra can recover against
Mr. Versaw for the injuries she suffered." (Farmers' Brief at p. 8.) This argument, however,
misses the point.
Farmers confuses Mrs. Vierra's right to recover all of her damages against Mr.
Versaw with her right to settle with Mr. Versaw for one of the $30,000 per person coverages
he purchased. By virtue of the Married Woman's Act, Mrs. Vierra has not only the right to
individually pursue a judgment for the full extent of her damages from Mr. Versaw, she has
the right to individually settle for his policy limits.
Her ability and right to settle, rather than sue, is critical here. It is stipulated that Mrs.
Vierra offered to settle her claims against Mr. Versaw for a per person policy limit of
$30,000. (R. at 161.) It is also stipulated that Farmers responded in kind with a $30,000
offer to Mrs. Vierra, but conditioned its offer on her husband's release of his loss of
consortium claim. (R. at 161.) Based on these facts,3 the only thing that prevented Mrs.
Vierra from settling is the fact that she is married.
3

Farmers' statement of the facts (Farmers' Brief, p. 2-3) differ from those
stipulated to for this Declaratory Action and its appeal. Farmers' characterization of the
facts should be disregarded. The facts stipulated to by Farmers (R. 160-1,205 and 231) are
set forth in the Vierras' opening Brief at pages 6 and 7.
-3-

Thus, contrary to Farmers' assertions, the Married Woman's Act is impacted here and
the Vierras' reliance on it and the Utah Constitution is appropriate.4 Mrs. Vierra could have
and would have settled her claim if she had not been prevented from doing so because she
was so badly injured that her husband also has a loss of consortium. (R. at 254, p. 14.)
Farmers' position not only offends rights guaranteed by the Married Woman's Act
and the Utah Constitution, it is completely contrary to the purpose of the loss of consortium
statute. Because a loss of consortium claim can only arise in Utah when one spouse suffers
a serious injury, insurance limits are often inadequate to compensate that spouse. The
legislature presumably was aware of this and could not have intended to penalize either
spouse by creating a statutory claim that requires a husband and wife to split a single per
person insurance limit. In Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030,
1034 (Utah 2000) this Court noted that "when called upon to interpret a statute, 'our primary
goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve.'" Quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). By enacting the loss
of consortium statute, the legislature did not intend to further harm injured spouses.
Therefore, based on the purpose and language of the loss of consortium statute and
Farmers' concession that loss of consortium claims are distinct, and in light of the Married
Woman's Act, the Utah Constitution, and the stipulated facts of this case, Farmers must
furnish two separate per person insurance limits in an amount up to $30,000 each.
4

Farmers' interpretation of its policy language offends the Utah Constitution
because it deprives Mrs. Vierra of the civil right and privilege of settling her claim, treats
seriously inj ured people differently based on whether they are married and treats its insureds
differently if they seriously injure married people.
-4-

IL

READ TOGETHER, THE TWO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM PARAGRAPHS
IN FARMERS' POLICY ARE HOPELESSLY AMBIGUOUS,
With respect to ambiguity, Farmers frames the issue as "whether the Farmers policy

provided to Mr. Versaw complies with Utah law and plainly limits the loss of consortium
claim to a one person limit." (Farmers' Brief at p.7) (emphasis added.) Farmers' policy
does not plainly limit the loss of consortium claim in that manner. Nor is it true that
"Farmers policy informed Mr. Versaw that loss of consortium was included in the one
person limit." (Farmers' Brief at p. 7) (emphasis added.) To make those assertions, Farmers
must completely ignore the second loss of consortium paragraph in its policy. However,
when the second paragraph, which incorporates "financial responsibility laws," is read with
the first, the policy becomes hopelessly ambiguous and makes it impossible for Mr. Versaw,
a lay person, to understand the actual loss of consortium coverages and limits purchased and
provided.
The trial court erred in rejecting arguments that Farmers' second paragraph creates
ambiguity with this policy language: "If the financial responsibility law of the place of the
accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will
be furnished." (R. 254, p. 9) (emphasis omitted.) Farmers argued to the trial court that there
is no ambiguity or inconsistency in this language, and on appeal it attempts to support that
premise by further arguing in its Brief that it does not need to provide separate per person
coverages because "Utah's Financial Responsibility Law is a specific body of law, which
has no requirement for separate limits." (Farmers' Brief, p. 11) (emphasis added.)
Farmers' Brief even capitalizes "Financial Responsibility Law."
-5-

There are several problems with Farmers' attempt to avoid this obvious ambiguity by
arguing that it can incorporate "Utah Financial Responsibility Law."
First, it is primarily the reference to "financial responsibility law" that makes the
policy's two loss of consortium paragraphs, as read together, ambiguous. The capitalized
term "Financial Responsibility Law" is relied on by Farmers in its Brief and the noncapitalized terms is contained in the second paragraph of its policy, but neither that term nor
the monetary limits for third-party loss of consortium claims under any financial
responsibility law are defined anywhere in Farmers' policy.5

Moreover, the phrase

"Financial Responsibility Law" is not defined or used in any of the statutes discussed in

5

Farmers' policy does not disclose what separate coverages and limits of
coverage apply to loss of consortium claims in Utah where the "law . . . treats the loss of
consortium as a separate claim," it merely indicates that "financial responsibility will be
furnished." (R. at 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (emphasis
omitted.) The only applicable indication of coverage limits is in the Declaration which lists
$30,000 for "each person" and $60,000 for "each occurrence." (R. at 28 and Brief of
Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A, p. 3.)
Interestingly, just below the second loss of consortium paragraph is a permissive user
provision which states: "We will provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or
a family member, up to the limits of Utah's Financial Responsibility Law only of $25,000
per person, $50,000 per occurrence for bodily injury, and $15,000 for property damage."
(R. at 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (emphasis omitted.) This
reference to permissive users has nothing to do with loss of consortium and by its placement
directly under the second loss of consortium paragraph, it makes Farmers' policy more
confusing. This ambiguity is further compounded by additional references to "Financial
Responsibility Laws" with different dollar limits in Farmers' policy. For example, on page
9 of the policy the limits for "underinsured motorist" loss of consortium claims (which is
inapplicable here) are listed as "$10,000 each person and $20,000 each occurrence." For
whatever reason, Farmers left its third-party loss of consortium provision ambiguous by not
including any coverage amounts. This ambiguity could have been easily corrected by
referring to Utah's minimum statutory limits and then listing those limits as was done in
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dangleish. 2002 UT 59 ^ 14, 52 P.3d 1142.
-6-

Farmers' Brief. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303 and §31A-22-304. As explained by
counsel for Mr. Versaw at oral argument before the trial court, it is "wrong [for Fanners] to
put th[e] burden on the insured and on the claimant to show what the law of the state is . .
. that creates an ambiguity." (R. at 254, p. 20.)
Second, it is surprising that Farmers would put such emphasis on the ambiguous
phrase: "Financial Responsibility Law." Ten years ago, in Cullum v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993), this Court rejected similar language from a Farmers'
automobile policy which purposed "to limit coverage provided to permissive users but [did]
not identify the limits. Rather, it refer[red] to an undefined 'Financial Responsibility Law'."
Cullum, 857 P.2d at 925. Cullum did not specifically reach the ambiguity issue before this
Court.

Instead, Cullum held that the policy's reference to "an undefined Financial

Responsibility Law" violated Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106.6 Cullum, 857 P.2d at 927.
6

It is also surprising that Farmers did not bring Cullum to the trial court's
attention because the same firm that represents Farmers in this matter argued Cullum. Utah
Code Ann. §31A-21-106 was not specifically raised below. However, the statutory
incorporation issue was clearly presented in the briefs submitted to the trial court and during
argument below. For example, the Vierras argued that Farmers' policy language
places on Farmers' insureds, who are typically lay persons like Mr.
Versaw, the burden of knowing and interpreting the law as it relates to the
specific legal issue now before this court
Thus, Farmers' policy language
flags its own weakness and is therefore not only ambiguous it creates
ambiguity because it is virtually impossible for lay persons to know what they
are buying. This policy language forces Farmers insureds to either remain
uncertain about the extent of their coverage, or to undertake an
interpretation of the law.
This alone is troublesome, but the ambiguity is made even worse where, as
here, Farmers and its insured have undertaken an effort to interpret the law
(continued...)
-7-

The rationale and result of Cullum, however, are equally applicable to the claim here that
Farmers' policy is ambiguous.
In Cullum, this Court discussed an insured's need to be able to determine from the
policy itself exactly what coverages and limits he or she had purchased. The Court noted:
"This goal would be defeated by allowing incorporation of substantive statutory provisions
just as it would by allowing incorporation of other written material" Cullum, 857 P.2d at
925. It then wrote:

6

(... continued)
and have come to different conclusions about what the law is. The fact that
Farmers takes one position while Mr. Versaw takes another,
demonstrates the inherent ambiguity resulting from policy language
which attempts to say one thing and then modifies that by an express
incorporation of the [financial responsibility] law. In short, Farmers'
policy is ambiguous because it requires lay insureds to reconcile Utah's
financial responsibility and insurance laws with Utah's loss of consortium
law, and further ambiguity results when their conclusions differ.
(R. at 169-70) (emphasis added.) The problems with statutory incorporation were also
addressed by the Vierras in their original Brief in this appeal: "The policy language in this
case cannot be readily analyzed for ambiguity... because the language goes outside of the
four corners of the policy and leaves to the insured and the courts the burden of
determining, on the basis of indefinite reference [to "financial responsibility law"],
whether one or two 'single person' policy limits are available." (See Brief of Appellants
Arthur Vierra and Corina Vierra, p. 8) (emphasis added.)
Under all of these circumstances it is appropriate to consider the effect of Utah Code
Ann. §31A-21-106 on Farmers' argument that its policy is not ambiguous and is in
compliance with Utah law. The issue was sufficiently raised and addressed below, even if
the applicable statute is only specifically identified now. See IFG Leasing Company v.
Gordon. 776 P.2d 607, n. 5 (Utah 1989) quoting Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 n. 4
(Utah 1987) ("This Court may decide a case upon a proper ground even though not argued
by the parties."); Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A.. 611 P.2d 392, 295 (Utah
1980) ("Court, in its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition
may require, even if first raised in a reply brief")
-8-

This case presents an excellent example of the foregoing problem, for an
owner insured under defendant's policy cannot determine his or her coverage
solely by relying on the document. An important element - the amount of
coverage provided for permissive users - is not disclosed. Intact, the insured
would have great difficulty discovering exactly what coverage this policy
provides. This policy does not specify the law to which it refers.
CuUum,857P.2dat925.
Farmers' policy is not only ambiguous because it does not specify the law to which
it refers, but also its attempted incorporation of the "financial responsibility law" violates
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106 as explained by Cullum. Therefore, Farmers' policy fails
both parts of the two part analytical test Farmers urged on the trial court. Farmers' counsel
argued that "when confronted with a contract issue, [the Court] should [first] look at the
language of the contract. If it's clear and unambiguous on its face . . . then [it should] look
at the statutory language to be sure that the contract language doesn't violate any of the
statutory language." (R. at 254, p. 6.) Here the policy language is both ambiguous and in
violation of Utah Code Ann, §31A-21-106.
Third, even if the policy's phrase "financial responsibility law" refers to a "specific
body of law" which is easily accessed by lay insureds, which it does not (see Cullum, 857
P,2d at 924-6), and even if it were construed to consist of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303
and/or §31A-22-304, Fanners' policy language remains ambiguous. As in Cullum, "[t]he
policy at issue here fails to inform the insured of the amount of liability coverage provided
[... despite the fact that,] to an insured, coverage amounts are the most critical features of
an insurance policy." Cullum, 857 P,2d at 926.

-9-

Fourth, Farmers' argument that there is no language in the "Financial Responsibility
Law" specifying that loss of consortium will be a separate claim (R. at 254, p. 25; Farmers'
Brief, p. 11) misses the point. Even when omitting the words "financial responsibility,"
Farmers' policy speaks in terms of how Utah law "treats" a loss of consortium claim, not
whether Utah law "specifies" it as a separate claim. Farmers concedes that "Utah's loss of
consortium statute makes plain that one spouse's loss of consortium claim is separate and
distinct from the other spouse's bodily injury claim." (Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) Therefore, its
ambiguous policy language should not be allowed to define or otherwise limit the body of
Utah law the trial court should have considered when analyzing the per person issue. At a
minimum, the trial court should have analyzed all of the applicable Utah statutes and
constitutional provisions which govern loss of consortium claims. In Cullum. Farmers
conceded this point when it asserted that "all statutes are considered to be incorporated in
every contract." CuUum, 857 P.2d at 925.
Similarly, to the extent Utah does generally have financial responsibility laws, they
must, at a minimum, be read in conformity with other applicable Utah statutes. As noted
recently in Cazares v. Cosbv. 2003 UT 3, f 19, 65 P.2d 1184, 1188, this Court
assumes that the legislature, in [enacting new statutes] was mindful of
[existing statutes and their] related subject matter and wished [that both] be
given effect. See Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983)
(citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §51.02 (4th ed. 1973)
for the proposition that legislatures know of statutes of related subject matter
and have them in mind when enacting new statutes).
The trial court should not have subordinated the Married Woman's Act (enacted in 1898)
to the ambiguous language of Farmers' insurance policy or any subsequent statutes. It
-10-

should have read and construed all applicable statutory provisions together and applied them
to the stipulated facts of this case.
In summary, the ambiguity arising from Farmers' reference to and reliance on its
policy's "financial responsibility law" language is not insignificant. Farmers correctly points
out that ambiguity is not created just because one party to a contract interprets its language
differently than another party. (Farmer's Brief, p. 9.) However, this is not such a case. The
ambiguity arising from trying to reconcile the first loss of consortium paragraph with the
second is inescapable. Certainly the meaning of this insurance policy would not "be plain
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and
reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in the light
of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy." LPS Hospital v. Capital
Life Insurance Company. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1998).
In terms of loss of consortium coverages and limits, Farmers sold Mr. Versaw an
ambiguous policy. This ambiguity was created by Farmers' failure to understand or comply
with the laws of Utah. Because Farmers attempts to exclude or limit loss of consortium
coverage and limits with ambiguous language, that language must be strictly construed
against it. US Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P. 2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). It is
well settled that "ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage." U.S.
Fidelity, at 854 P.2d at 522.
Farmers owes Mr. Versaw two $30,000 per person limit coverages in this case.

-11-

III.

EACH OF THE CASES CITED IN FARMERS' BRIEF FROM OTHER
STATES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FOR MULTIPLE REASONS.
Farmers relies on ten cases from other jurisdictions in support of its argument that its

policy "clearly and unambiguously" provides that a loss of consortium claim is included in
its one person policy limit. (Farmers' Brief, p. 9.) None of the ten cases cited in Farmers'
Brief, however, deal in any way with the ambiguity that exists in the insurance policy before
this Court, i.e., the ambiguity which arises when the first and second loss of consortium
paragraphs are read together. Either these ten cases quote no similar or applicable policy
language: Sweeden v. Farmers Insurance Group, 71 Ark. App. 381,30 S.WJd 783 (2000);
Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 341 S.C. 143, 533 S.E.2d
597 (2000); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820 (Wyo. 2000); Teplyv.
Ballard, 922 P.2d 1236 (Or. App. 1996); Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 839 P.2d 71
(Kan. App. 1992); Campbell v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona, 745 P.2d 160 (Ariz. App.
1987); Bain v. Gleason, 726 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1986); and Montgomery v. Farmers
Insurance Group, Mid Century Insurance Company, 585 F. Supp. 618 at 619 (S.D. Ind.
1984), or they analyze the two paragraphs in question without any reference to the ambiguity
resulting from the second paragraph: Mid Century Insurance Co. v. Bash, 211 Cal. App. 3d
431, 259 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1989); and Nollen v. Reynolds, 962 P.2d 633 (N.M. 1998).
Therefore, these cases can neither help nor inform this Court's analysis of the Vierras'
ambiguity argument and are clearly distinguishable.
Similarly, none of the cases Farmers has cited from other jurisdictions address the
specific arguments presented in this case. For example, none of the cited cases reconcile
-12-

their holdings with a Married Woman's Act (or like state law), or constitutional concerns
similar to those raised here. There simply was no legal challenge under similar statutory or
constitutional provisions in any of the cases Farmers cites. And, of course, none of them
deal with the stipulated facts upon which this case was brought. For each of these reasons,
all of Farmers' case authority is distinguishable.
Some of the cases Farmers relies on do reach the conclusion that the phrase "financial
responsibility law" refers to a specific body of law in their respective states , but those cases
(for example, Nollen and Bash) are directly contrary to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106 and
this Court's analysis in Cullum and Dangleish. Therefore, they are not authoritative and are
again distinguishable.
In summary, Farmers' Brief concedes, among other points, that the "policy of
automobile liability insurance issued to Mr. Versaw must insure him against loss from
liability imposed by law, including liability pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium statute."
(Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) Its policy's confusing reference to and attempted incorporation of
"financial responsibility law" on the critical issue of whether the law requires, or the policy
provides, for one policy limit or two renders the policy both ambiguous and non-compliant
with Utah law. Under these circumstances, the trial court's ruling that Farmers' policy
requires Mr. Vierra's loss of consortium claim and Mrs. Vierra's bodily injury claim to be
combined and reduced to a single person policy limit is erroneous. Farmers has cited no
applicable cases to the contrary.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, based on the purpose and language of the loss of consortium statute,
Farmers' legal concessions, the Married Woman's Act, the Utah Constitution, the stipulated
facts of this case, and the policy's ambiguity, Farmers must furnish Mr. Versaw two separate
per person insurance limits in an amount up to $30,000 each. For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of
Mr. Versaw and the Vierras.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5~ 4 Niayof May, 2003.
HOpL1#& KING, L.C.

Roger H. Hoole
Attorneys for Appellants,
Arthur and Corina Vierra
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